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Abstract
Facing the problems of corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, a lack of property rights or of the rule of law in developing countries, Paul 
Romer, the current Chief Economist of the World Bank, has chosen a radical approach when he provided advice to the Honduran 
government in 2010. His idea was to establish a new constitution of the regional administrations and the legal framework in areas 
of developing countries where no settlements exist. To establish such a special administrative region, so called Charter City, a 
developing country requires a partner country which already enjoys credibility in terms of a functional administrative order. A high 
level of trust is presupposed, because the Charter City will be highly independent from the state ruling government. In fact Romer 
assumes that it is far easier to establish a new framework under the condition of good governance in a region which will attract 
citizens and investors than to change an existing system. Certainly the possibilities of a far-reaching independence contain some 
fundamental problems at the same time. The cultural heritage of a society and the country-specific characteristics might oppose 
the new order. Even when no one should be forced to live in a Charter City such problems will occur, because not only the region 
will change but also the rest of the country will be affected in the long term. In this context the activities of a partner country 
could be seen as an act of paternalism. The paper deals with the theoretical background of trust and compatibility in international 
administrative cooperation such as Charter Cities.
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1 Introduction
The increasing world population will confront us with seri-
ous challenges in a connected world. Since 2008, for the first 
time in human history, more than half of the world’s popu-
lation is living in cities. The process of urbanization mainly 
happens in emerging and developing countries (Population 
Reference Bureau, 2007). Especially those countries suffer 
from pauperism, bad infrastructure, political instability or 
military conflicts. Although military conflicts were respon-
sible for a huge number of refugees in the last few years, the 
migration pressure caused by economic reasons rises, too. 
Since most of the causes of flight need to be combated within 
the countries of origin, it is inevitable to improve the local 
life conditions. This paper discusses whether and how the 
development of an independent administration, offered by 
a foreign nation, could be a suitable approach to guarantee 
political and legal stability in order to improve living condi-
tions and reduce international poverty migration.
The on-going political debates about populism and 
nationalism reveal the importance of social and economic 
stability. The migration crisis puts the European Union 
to the test. In this context, however, it is obvious that of 
course not just financial and cultural cleavages occur in 
the European Union. Certainly, it is a catastrophe for 
the origin countries in the first place. The German econ-
omist, Michael Voigtländer (2016), argues that losing a 
generation of young, productive and communicative cit-
izens tears an entire nation. The problem admittedly is 
not unknown, but the proposed solutions are very differ-
ent and part of a controversial debate. A radical approach 
was formulated by the current Chief Economist and 
Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Paul Romer. 
He calls his concept Charter Cities. These are special 
administration zones within the territory of emerging and 
developing countries. These zones are characterized by a 
high independence from the local government. Foreign 
Countries provide the administration to credibly imple-
ment elements of good governance, which the United 
Nations define as:
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“Good governance has eight major characteristics. 
It is participatory, consensus oriented, account-
able, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.” 
(UNESCAP, 2009: p. 1)
Romer alludes to the remarkable up growth of Hong 
Kong. When the People’s Republic of China was pro-
claimed in 1949 Hong Kong, during that time a crown col-
ony of the British Empire, became a haven for millions 
of people and countless companies. In contrast to the 
communistic China, in Hong Kong market-based econ-
omy was established under the rule of British law. In 1997 
Hong Kong was assigned to China as one of the most 
powerful economic regions in Asia. China followed the 
example given by Hong Kong and founded itself 15 spe-
cial economic zones in the mid-1980s. For that reason the 
US-American publicist George Gilder (2015) emphasizes 
that China did not take over Hong Kong but Hong Kong 
altered China. Of course the British rule was associated 
with military power and force. Romer, however, considers 
a voluntary relinquishment of national sovereignty to be 
possible, too. As an effect of a voluntary relinquishment 
of national sovereignty a Charter City would enjoy legit-
imacy. In Romer’s point of view it would resist against 
every criticism calling this neocolonialism.
In the following section the leak of trust within adminis-
trations and societies will be discussed. For this purpose it 
is indispensable to distinguish between formal and informal 
institutions and interpersonal and generalized trust. This 
section is not a central issue of this paper, but it is important 
to understand where the idea of Charter Cities intervenes. 
In the third section the focus is on the concept of Charter 
Cities in particular. The paper will identify the main compo-
nents on which a Charter City might be built on. Therefore, 
it is worth to outline Romer’s concept which he elaborated 
in cooperation with the Honduran government in the early 
2010s. Fourthly a review of the concept of Charter Cities 
against the background of institutions and trust will be pre-
sented. Moreover, the paper discusses the basis of legitimacy 
and the possible side effects of this project.
2 Institutions and Trust
If someone does not want to prejudge the idea of Charter 
Cities as a neocolonialist one, he or she has to understand 
the problems of bad governance in political systems and 
administrations. To prevent misunderstandings it is help-
ful to introduce Douglas North’s famous definition of 
institutions at this point:
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interac-
tion. They consist of both informal constraints […], 
and formal rules […]. Throughout history, institu-
tions have been devised by human beings to create 
order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.” (North, 
1991: p. 97)
On the contrary, organizations are actors, who interre-
late with institutions. In particular, formal rules are con-
trollable by different organizations. Depending from the 
existing political system, governments and parliaments 
as well as the people or non-democratic rulers are able 
to alter a country’s laws or the constitution. Fundamental 
problems occur if these rules are not effective or modified 
in a bad way. This is called bad governance if one or more 
of the eight criteria of good governance have been con-
travened. In some cases this can explain huge differences 
in the living standard between two areas with same nat-
ural and cultural preconditions. The most obvious exam-
ple is the gap between North and South Korea. Of course 
the North Korean regime is too powerful and is not inter-
ested in changing the status quo. On the other hand it is 
also possible that a government is too weak to improve the 
framework. In this case it is worth mentioning the exam-
ple of Haiti. While Haiti’s neighbor state, the Dominican 
Republic, became a vacation paradise, Haiti is still strug-
gling with basic needs such as running water or electric 
supply (Allmeling, 2013). This suggests that the function-
ality of a system depends on its resistance against elite 
interests, because these lead to an inner inertness.
However, in reality often formal institutions are not 
crucial. Although it is possible to modify formal rules 
without any problems if the responsible persons are will-
ing to do so, this does not mean that it is followed by the 
desired outcome in any case. Informal constraints and val-
ues such as customs and traditions are entrenched much 
more deeply in a society. In general, these kinds of institu-
tions are inflexible in the short run. Solely shocking expe-
riences are able to influence them in the short run. In addi-
tion to that, the Dutch cultural scientist Geert Hofstede et 
al. (2010: p. 20) developed a so-called Onion Model. The 
Onion’s core consists of social values. The second level 
compromises rituals, while the third implies heroes. The 
forth and outer level includes all kinds of symbols. Rituals, 
heroes and symbols are a form of practices that are per-
formed daily. The further away from the core a level is 
located, the quicker the content can be changed. Cultural 
values shape during childhood and it is very difficult to 
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shift them. Hofstede therefore equates the national system 
of values with “given facts”.
At this point it is important to expand the Onion Model 
by adding the dimension of trust. The German Economist 
Martin Raiser (1999: p. 4) distinguishes between three 
bonds of trust. The first group includes trust, which is 
generated through family relations. He calls it “ascribed 
trust”. The second category, named “process-based trust”, 
bases on friendships and acquaintanceships. Referring 
to Barbara Bernstein et al. (2006: p. 11), it seems reason-
able to unite both groups to a single one, called “interper-
sonal trust”. The third group is separated. “Extended trust” 
(Raiser, 1999: p. 4) or generalized trust occurs with anony-
mous interactions. Whereas interpersonal trust often roots 
in experiences, generalized trust is placed in advance and 
is independent form social relations. By transferring this 
to the economic system an inherent problem is noticeable. 
While in village communities the interpersonal trust plays 
a key role, the globalized world is characterized by gen-
eralized trust. The division of labor and the international 
trade happen at anonymous markets. This demands gener-
alized trust in the society or in organizations that control 
those processes. Trust in political organizations is a special 
form of generalized trust. This is called political trust. The 
Canadian political scientist David Easton (1975: p. 437) 
focused his research on political structures and their legit-
imacy. He puts forward the thesis that two components are 
responsible for the stability of a political system. On the 
one hand it is the so-called “specific support” which refers 
to the political outcome. In other words citizens support a 
government because of its specific results. Of course the 
specific trust depending on economic circumstances and 
other impacts can be highly volatile. On the other hand 
there is the so-called “diffuse support”. It bases on political 
trust and is deeply embedded in cultural values. In this case 
citizens support the political system in general because it 
matches their social values. Among other reasons, differ-
ent forms of rule have emerged due to various social val-
ues. Easton figured out that it is exactly the diffuse support, 
which stabilizes a system in the long run.
Now it is important to focus on the problem of bad gov-
ernance again. A high level of corruption and non-trans-
parency destroys the political trust, while at the same 
time a lack of generalized trust leads to more interper-
sonal interactions that the shadow economy follows. The 
idea of exchanging political organizations from outside to 
break the vicious circle and to gain the people’s general-
ized trust sets in at that point. It is very important to keep 
in mind that changing social values is not the aim of this 
process, but to benefit from social know-how. The rule of 
law is a basic condition to achieve this. Especially when 
it comes down to foreign investors who plan to make long 
term investments this aspect is crucial. Nevertheless, the 
close link of legitimacy, values and different types of trust 
is a complex one which must be taken into account in the 
further argumentation of this paper.
3 Structure of a Charter City
In the previous section, it was ascertained that creat-
ing a special administration zone, rather than reforming 
the existing system, may provide a solution to break the 
vicious circle of distrust and bad governance. In this con-
text Brandon Fuller and Paul Romer (2012), the current 
Chief Economist of the World Bank, designed a radical 
approach with his idea of a Charter City. A Charter City 
is a special administration zone which is independent 
from its origin country’s system to the greatest possible 
extent while offering a legal framework in terms of good 
governance.
The implementation of a Charter City bases on three dif-
ferent roles, states need to assume. The host country offers 
an area in its territory on which a Charter City will be 
constructed. In general, the host country is characterized 
as a developing country. The same applies to the source 
country. Citizens, who live and work in the Charter City, 
mainly originate from this country. The third role is taken 
over by a developed country which offers and implements 
a functioning administration and provides the legislation 
and jurisdiction. Consequently, having a functioning rule 
of law and a trustworthy administration in its own land is 
the most important requirement for handling this task. For 
that reason, this role is described as the guarantor country. 
Although one country could take on all roles at the same 
time, it is more likely that there are overlaps between the 
host and source country. Additionally, it does not neces-
sarily have to be a single guarantor country, since cooper-
ation with several guarantor countries is also conceivable.
Besides these three roles, the Charter City concept is 
based on four pillars that can be considered as require-
ments. As its name suggests, the first requirement is the 
charter itself. The charter constitutes the general struc-
ture of the Charter City as well as the cooperation agree-
ment between the host and the guarantor country. In 
other words, this pillar deals with the constitutional law. 
It determines the primary law in which the Charter City 
is embedded. While the primary law symbolizes the first 
pillar, the secondary law represents the second pillar. 
The third pillar is all about fundamental freedoms such 
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as free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. 
The fourth pillar contains some requirements on the ter-
ritory of the Charter City. First of all, it is essential that 
the Charter City is located in an uninhabited area. After 
all, the legitimacy that stabilizes the Charter City results 
from a voluntary acceptance by the citizens. No one must 
be forced to accept the new constitutional order. Instead of 
that, people who move to the Charter City actively decide 
to live under those circumstances. Romer builds his argu-
mentation on the ability of free choice. In his opinion, the 
legitimacy consists of the process of voting by feet. The 
free movement of persons has a key role to play in this 
matter. On account of this, an entire state or a dispropor-
tionately large region is not suitable for the implementa-
tion of a Charter City. In order to ensure that a Charter City 
can develop to a metropolis, it must also be constructed in 
a convenient location. This includes the consideration of 
location advantages. Ideally, it is located in a coastal area 
to provide a logistical connection to the world market by 
using an international harbor. To effect a positive devel-
opment, a Charter City needs to encompass a proper size. 
National and international investors need to be attracted 
by the legal framework, but they also have to encounter a 
sufficiently large area. Besides a modern infrastructure, 
companies benefit from synergy effects and economies of 
scale. For this reason too, it is important to provide settle-
ment areas for the workers and their families, as well as for 
universities or other major organizations. Another desir-
able factor is to reach enough people to achieve a signifi-
cant improvement. It would be a laborious and ineffective 
process at village level. This argument is also related to 
the degree of trust within a society. In villages or smaller 
cities trust takes place on a personal level, while in bigger 
cities it is more about generalized trust. This is an import-
ant principle of the individualized capitalist system, where 
anonymous parties enter into contracts without knowing 
each other. However, a Charter City should not exceed a 
certain magnitude. In addition to the argument of legiti-
macy, a very big Charter City would be confronted with 
other problems such as a lack of transparency or incalcu-
lable risk. Because of this, a metropolitan region combines 
economic advantages with social responsibility.
In the case of Honduras, where a Charter City was 
almost established, concrete state structure has already 
been worked out. At the center of the Charter City was a 
Transparency Commission, which consisted of nine mem-
bers and was supposed to make the essential political deci-
sions. This transparency commission was supposed to rep-
resent the partner countries and would therefore not have 
been democratically elected by the inhabitants of Charter 
City. There should have been a legislative council subor-
dinate to it, which would have regulated the secondary 
law. Furthermore, a Governor would have been appointed 
by the Transparency Commission to lead the administra-
tion. An audit committee would have collected statistics in 
order to evaluate the different state elements and to create 
transparency. The Charter City’s Courts would also have 
been subject to external appeals courts.
4 Critical Reviews on the Concept of Charter Cities
So far, this paper illustrates several problems of bad 
governance and specifies the conditions under which a 
Charter City can be constructed. However, the implemen-
tation of a Charter City faces other challenges and diffi-
culties, too. One of the most controversial aspects is the 
loss of control by the national authorities. A democratic 
participation is very limited not only during the process of 
formation. The Honduran constitutional court has already 
construed it as a contravention of state sovereignty when 
Romer and other experts wanted to implement the concept 
in Honduras in the early 2010s. In fact, the citizens would 
not be able to control the Charter City’s new and inde-
pendent leadership or to shape its political direction. The 
principle of equality with the rest of the country would at 
least be partially broken (Bird, 2012). At the same time, 
such a radical approach may be seen as a kind of pater-
nalism (Himmelreich, 2010). In general, the idea seems to 
touch on a Eurocentric perspective. Thinking that crises in 
less developed countries could be resolved by adhering to 
Western ideas is very naive, negligent and in a way arro-
gant. History has apparently shown us that this cannot be 
very successful either.
Using Hong Kong as an example might be tempting, but 
de facto this is only a rare exception. Rather, history has 
taught us that the export of political systems and admin-
istrations is essentially accompanied by major conflicts. 
Furthermore the successful development of Hong Kong 
must been seen in a broader perspective. Looking back at 
the enormous rise of Hong Kong, it must be considered, 
that in the background of all there was a main conflict 
evoked by the two systems during the Cold War. The pre-
conditions for globalization were fundamentally different 
from today. Although institutional interrelations and bad 
governance matter today in large areas of Africa and Latin 
America as they mattered in Hong Kong 40 years ago, it 
is negligent to assume that the effects of Charter Cities 
can be seen in the light of Hong Kong’s history. Several 
decades of development aid and development cooperation 
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also told us that the effort of implementing good gover-
nance brings up new conflicts. A code of conduct can cer-
tainly be prescribed, but it is far more difficult to influ-
ence social values. A Charter City is therefore confronted 
with uncontrollable peculiarities rooted in informal insti-
tutions. Geert Hofstede comments on this as follows:
“A country’s values are strongly related to the struc-
ture and functioning of its institutions […]. An 
important consequence of this fact is, that we can-
not change the way people in a country think, feel 
and act by simply importing foreign institutions.” 
(Hofstede et al., 2010: p. 24)
He continues his reservations and doubts and disputes 
that there is something like a universal path of develop-
ment that can be demonstrated by developed countries: 
“The rest of the world is not going Western [...]. 
Elections are not a universal solution to political 
problems. […] Free market capitalism cannot be uni-
versal; it presumes an individualist mentality that is 
missing in most of the world. […] Countries became 
more individualist after they increased in wealth, not 
wealthier by becoming more individualist. Free mar-
ket capitalism suits countries already wealthy and is 
unlikely to turn poor countries into wealthy ones.” 
(Hofstede et al., 2010: p. 414)
A contradiction can be noticed. On the one hand, the 
cultural background of two different countries working 
together in a Charter City might be too great. It is not 
possible to simply adopt a functioning process from one 
country to another without focusing on the cultural pecu-
liarities that are in some way connected to the problems 
that make this involvement necessary. This means that a 
Charter City needs to exclude certain characteristics of the 
source country’s cultural imprint. Excluding these charac-
teristics is only possible by not permitting a democratic 
order. This leads on the other hand to a democratic guar-
antor country acting in an undemocratic manner. Here, 
too, we must ask ourselves what characteristics the partner 
countries should bring with them. Even if the partnership 
is to be built on the principles of good governance, these 
criteria will reach their limits owing to the way in which 
they would be implemented. Due to contradictory behav-
ior the guarantor country loses some of its credibility. The 
risk of paternalism resonates. People living in Charter 
Cities would not be able to take part in the politics, but 
only be able to consume the political outcome. This leads 
us to believe that these people are no citizens who have a 
say in policies, but that they are merely inhabitants. It is 
therefore questionable whether it is possible to bridge the 
gap between the consideration of cultural circumstances 
and the necessary transformation. The fact that some 
vacancies in the new administration system will have 
to be filled by local people does not guarantee a strong 
link between the both sides. In other words it is unclear 
whether an external actor is only able to reinforce the spe-
cific support or to receive diffuse support, too. Especially 
in very poor and impoverished regions it can happen that 
people are attracted primarily by a better economic status, 
but not by political trust.
The difficulties concerning this issue do not just occur 
between developed countries and developing countries but 
even within the European Union. Struggles of transfor-
mation processes are for example still visible in the for-
mer communist countries of Eastern Europe even after 
more than 25 years. A relatively high level of corruption 
and a lack of generalized trust still exist in these societies 
today. The current political crisis in the European Union 
reveals the enormous conflicts regarding the different cul-
tural imprints that can already occur within a family of 
states. This inner-European conflict clearly shows that 
even within a broadly integrated community of states, the 
transfer of competences can lead to existential conflicts 
even under the priority of good governance. An existen-
tial lack of mutual understanding can be observed on both 
sides. In recent years, the European Union has allowed 
itself to drift apart by teaching in the decision-making 
process without analyzing and taking into account the 
social values of the member states. Ignorant attempts at 
Westernization are therefore doomed to failure. If this is 
applied to development cooperation, it must be recognized 
that it came to its limits in the past because the models suc-
cessfully applied in the developed West cannot be applied 
one-to-one to all states. Rather, individual solutions must 
be found that best address the challenges of individual 
states. Achieving this understanding of a partner country 
and then combining it with one’s own knowledge of good 
governance is a very great challenge.
This, however, is followed by a major problem of inter-
national relations, which would also come to bear in the 
case of a Charter City. After all, the partner countries 
are also pursuing their own agendas. No one can ensure 
that conflicts of interest do not arise. Particularly when 
we consider that the social values that stand in the back-
ground are different.
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Furthermore, due to the lack of opportunities for polit-
ical participation, economic freedom and the free move-
ment of persons are the main prerequisites for founding 
a Charter City. What Romer overrates in this context is 
his argument of voting by feet. The idea that people can 
always decide freely whether they want to move to a 
Charter City is only applicable if their living conditions 
are ignored. Just because people are not forced by a gov-
ernment to accept the new circumstances or to move to 
the Charter City does not mean that they leave their homes 
by free choice. If people are already risking their lives by 
passing the dessert or crossing the sea, despair is inhu-
man. So even if people move to a Charter City for eco-
nomic reasons, this does not always mean that it is an act 
of free choice. It is inappropriate to call this behavior a 
rational choice.
Moreover, the condition to build a Charter City on an 
unsettled land is difficult to fulfill. People have already 
populated almost every strip of the globe. Accordingly, 
you will usually come across sparsely populated areas 
belonging to a local minority, natives or peasants. Groups 
such as these would be threatened by forced displacement 
through state authority. Not only groups of residents may 
obstruct a Charter City, but also the powerful elite of the 
existing system will not agree to a voluntary abdication of 
power. The incidents of the Honduran project are strong 
evidence of this. The Honduran government tried to main-
tain its influence by negotiating with an international 
investment group, although Romer and other experts were 
expected to concretize the establishment on an indepen-
dent Charter City in Honduras. This was caused by the 
old elite finding themselves in a predicament. If a Charter 
City was successfully implemented, the old elite would be 
exposed as superfluous. This dilemma has the effect that 
the former elite is either trying to sabotage the successful 
development of Charter City from the outset or to claim 
the achievement itself. The former elite is therefore con-
fronted with a structural credibility problem. Concerning 
this matter, the lack of trust within a society becomes 
important again. However, there may also be a third group 
of disadvantaged people. It is highly doubtful whether the 
public at large will benefit from a Charter City. In con-
sequence of an efficient bureaucracy and pro-business 
adjusted tax system, it is very likely that foreign compa-
nies will force local enterprises out of the market, while 
they take the leading position in the Charter City’s ser-
vice sector. Thus, the German economist Stephan Klasen 
assumes that the well-educated and highly skilled labor 
force in particular will benefit from foreign investment 
(Seebens, 2010). This leads to a far-reaching brain drain in 
the host country. According to the idea of a Charter City, 
the agricultural sector will not be embedded in the met-
ropolitan area. This sector as well as the manufacturing 
sector will only indirectly benefit from the new system, if 
at all. At the same time, the increased income generated 
by foreign investment will increase the purchasing power 
and demand for goods. The costs of living will rise, which 
will not be affordable by all citizens. There is a continuing 
danger of leaving behind other areas of the host country. 
The voting by feet argument acts as a filter in two ways. 
In addition to this economic separation, ideological sep-
aration can also divide the country into a market liberal 
western part and a traditionally domestic part.
Due to increasing prices, however, some industries 
could be positively affected by a trickle-down effect. 
This effect may also extend to the surroundings. In order 
to avoid that the local population suffers from structural 
handicaps, the legal framework needs to ensure that the 
population can take part in the development process. For 
example, it is possible to set an employment rate or a min-
imum wage in order to strengthen the local population’s 
ability to participate in economic upturn. Whereas Klasen 
assumes a brain drain hitting the surrounding areas, other 
experts such as the American economist Matthew Kahn 
expect a positive spillover effect on the surroundings. 
Precisely because highly educated people will be attracted 
by the Charter City, more people aspire to higher educa-
tion. In fact, competition on the labor market will lead to 
more investments in the education system and a higher 
level of education throughout the whole country (Seebens, 
2010). Such spillover effects could also occur in other 
contexts. An advanced competition is normally followed 
by the pressure to be innovative and efficient. In order to 
achieve a truly profound level of legitimacy, it is therefore 
advisable to partially compensate the losers of the reform 
process from the gains made by the Charter City.
In addition to these practical consequences, a bridge 
back to the meaning of democracy and freedom will now 
be built. The German politician Günter Nooke puts into 
perspective the fear that a charter city restricts these funda-
mental rights by ruling beyond the people’s heads when he 
points out that the majority of development aid is already 
attached to conditions (Reifeld, 2010). Development loans 
from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund 
are basically linked to conditions that influence the recipi-
ent country’s political system and push it towards a system 
of good governance. Furthermore, it is important to keep 
in mind that even in western democracies there are lots of 
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undemocratic elements, such as national banks. Actually, 
administrative tasks and legal affairs in several coun-
tries have already been taken over by foreign partners. 
One example for such cooperation is the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Pennekamp, 
2010). Although a Charter City, as mentioned before, will 
be confronted with external resistances, one of the advan-
tages a Charter City brings is that there are no internal 
resistances. Here again, trustworthiness is a key factor 
because it is always connected to the future. If the new 
established political system confirms the shown trust, it 
will be able to shape the new metropolitan region very 
freely. In times of a rapidly growing world population and 
a dramatic urbanization process in the Third World, it is 
essential to shape the structures of aspiring cities as long 
as possible. Accompanying this process from the very 
beginning is crucial to sustainability in the sense of good 
governance. Paul Romer and his colleague Brandon Fuller 
summarize it as follows:
“The question, therefore, is not whether billions of 
people will soon gather together in cities, but where 
and under what conditions.” (Fuller and Romer, 
2012: p. 3)
While an increase in demand due to the rising world 
population leads to a shortage on a normal goods market, 
the concept of good governance and social know-how is 
spreading more and more (Reifeld, 2010).
5 Conclusion
Some people may see the idea of Charter Cities as a neo-
colonialist concept without democratic participation. This 
paper points out, however, that the aim is not to export 
western values to developing countries against their will. 
It is rather a question of providing support to countries in 
achieving a functioning rule of law if they intend to do 
so. Due to an inherent lack of generalized trust and bad 
governance, an external actor may most likely break the 
vicious circle. The biggest challenges during the imple-
mentation process are informal constraints As soon as a 
foreign actor tries to manipulate the cultural imprint, there 
will be strong backlashes. Voluntary selection is therefore 
inevitable. Nevertheless, people do not break with infor-
mal institutions just by crossing a border. Values simply 
are not alterable in the short run. They already have to be 
compatible to an individualistic system. For this reason, 
Charter Cities are not a universal solution, but they can 
contribute stability in various regions, depending on their 
ability to establish generalized trust and receive diffuse 
support. Specific support through economic development 
based on the rule of law might not suffice in the long run. 
Although the Charter City cannot be organized in a demo-
cratic structure, the inhabitants have to be involved. Travel 
facilitation, employees’ rights, and investments in the edu-
cation system, the health care system and infrastructure 
projects are essential to compensate for the piecemeal cul-
tural opening. Apart from this, the inhabitants must also 
play an increasingly important role in shaping the future 
of their Charter Cities over time. Of course they must also 
be integrated in the administrative work. But even if some 
locals hold important positions, the transition to self-reli-
ance depends on more or less arbitrary decisions by the 
guarantor country and the Transparency Commission. 
And even if Romer seems to solve the problem of legiti-
macy with a double safeguard by applying the concept of 
voting by feet at the individual level, it is necessary to first 
of all find a country that would be willing and legally able 
to renounce its sovereignty at the national level. 
Finally, from my point of view, the concept of Charter 
Cities does not seem to be a neocolonialist approach. 
Charter Cities bear on the rule of law and a twofold vol-
untary decision. It is indisputable that the rule of law is 
a basic condition to attract investors and companies in 
the globalized world. It seems reasonable to benefit from 
foreign administrations and international expertise. But 
apart from all the problems that may occur because of 
cultural differences, it is important to point out that a 
so-called voluntary decision does not always have to be 
a free decision. The argument of voting by feet does not 
guarantee the diffuse support that is important for a suc-
cessful development in the long run and it may cause an 
economical and ideological separation in the host and 
source country. All in all, Romer’s model is a reward-
ing idea, although it is very likely that several projects 
will fail, as the development in Honduras indicates.  It is 
worth thinking about this concept as a part of a responsi-
ble solution for preventing the migration pressure caused 
by economic reasons. However, sustainable development 
is only conceivable if the developed countries also rethink 
their cooperation and trade relations in other areas. The 
aim of the partnership cannot be to break the social val-
ues of another country make it follow a predefined devel-
opment path, but to understand these values and to find 
an individually adapted solution. Even though developed 
countries can provide a wide range of suggestions for 
improvement and can play a leading role in implementing 
the principles of good governance, there is often a lack of 
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understanding of the social values on which a successful 
implementation is based.
However, tensions will naturally also arise due to the 
fact that the partner country pursues a certain interest, too. 
For example, the European Union has now ventured into 
security policy cooperation with African states as part of 
its own geo-strategy. 
Although Romer’s idea of Charter Cities is an inter-
esting concept for a number of reasons, its pure form is 
unlikely to be implemented and would in any case have to 
distance itself clearly from arguments on modernization 
theory. Therefore, the theory of Charter Cities can provide 
added value primarily through regional cooperation and 
must clearly distinguish itself from westernization.
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